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LIVING ORIGINALISM:
THE MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR
By: Nelson Lund*
Until very recently, same-sex marriage would have been regarded
as a contradiction in terms. Today, questioning the merits of this novel
institution is treated as rank bigotry, and the extraordinary rapidity of
the change has been widely noted. Another recent development, perhaps not unrelated, has been the marriage of originalism and living
constitutionalism.
As an academic theory, originalism arose to counter what was seen
as lawless adventurism in the Warren and Burger Courts, displayed
especially in opinions that invoked the Fourteenth Amendment without a meaningful effort to interpret its text or to show that the decisions had anything to do with the original purpose of the
Amendment.1 As an academic theory, living constitutionalism, or
noninterpretivism, arose in defense of these decisions, which were
seen as worthy innovations.2 Advocates on both sides thought the two
theories were irreconcilable. Originalists maintained that judges
should respect the original meaning of the written Constitution,
namely its text, read when necessary in light of its enactors’ purposes.3
Noninterpretivists insisted that the original meaning is often impossible to identify and frequently should not be controlling in any event.
Professor Jack M. Balkin’s “living originalism” seeks to eliminate
the opposition between these theories, and he is open about his
agenda: “The notion that in order for liberals to believe in a living
Constitution they have to reject originalism in all of its forms is the
biggest canard ever foisted on them.”4 To adapt President Jefferson’s
* University Professor, George Mason University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 599, 599–602 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Making Noninterpretivism Respectable: Michael
J. Perry’s Contributions to Constitutional Theory, 81 MICH. L. REV. 782 (1983).
3. Originalists debate how best to identify the purposes of the Constitution’s enactors when the text is vague or ambiguous. By referring to original “purposes” in this
essay, I mean to leave aside a variety of disputes about whether the focus should be
on something called original intent or something called original public meaning, or
whether some other term is more apt. My argument here is meant to be independent
of the nuances of those debates, without conceding that originalism permits the imputation of purposes that were neither intended nor implied by the words that the enactors enacted.
4. Jack M. Balkin, How Liberals Can Reclaim the Constitution, WASH. POST (July
11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/07/11/conserva
tives-have-been-winning-the-constitutional-debate-but-liberals-are-about-to-stage-acomeback/ [http://perma.cc/D8FB-E9DC].
In truth, non-originalist liberals have foisted this putative canard on themselves
through their efforts to discredit originalism. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Constitutional
Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (1988); Paul Brest,
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V3.I1.2
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famous statement in his First Inaugural Address,5 Balkin exhorts us to
agree that we are all originalists, we are all living constitutionalists.
Perhaps he hopes to hasten the day when originalists meet the same
fate as the Federalist Party. If so, he has already made substantial
progress.
This essay begins with a brief summary of the core features of
Balkin’s theory. It then shows that one of his most prominent converts
has abandoned originalism, mistakenly believing that Balkin has
shown what originalism truly is.
LIVING ORIGINALISM

IN

BRIEF

As both its friends and adversaries have pointed out, originalism is
an imperfect interpretive theory, even apart from its potential to be
deployed incompetently or dishonestly. The original meaning of the
Constitution is unclear in many respects, and some provisions have
given rise to endlessly inconclusive debates. In addition, the original
meaning of Article III’s “judicial Power” entailed the somewhat flexible practice of stare decisis.6 When mistaken or very dubious precedents began to accumulate, courts inevitably had to choose which to
follow and which to distinguish or overrule. The Constitution provides
no clear and precise rule for making these choices. Durable discrepancies between judicial doctrine and original meaning thus were virtually
inevitable. Moreover, many choices involved in the interpretation of
the text, and in applying stare decisis, were bound to reflect judgments
more political than legal in nature.
The theory of the living constitution, or noninterpretivism, has its
own weaknesses. The judicial behavior it approves often looks like
raw political activism that amounts to “legislating from the bench.”
That may be attractive when the Constitution is changed in ways that
noninterpretivists find appealing. But what happens when courts invent new rights or powers that the proponents of this theory dislike, or
begin to cut back on non-originalist precedents that they like?
Noninterpretivists have little choice except to: (1) selectively appeal to
originalism; (2) accuse the courts of disrespect for precedents that
were themselves the result of disrespect for precedent; or (3) make
thinly veiled political attacks on the judges.
Now comes Jack Balkin, who offers to reconcile the parties and establish a durable marriage in which disagreements will be aired within
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877
(1996).
5. “We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.” Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp
[http://perma.cc/78AB-ETVQ].
6. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 809–25 (2009).
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the framework of a common enterprise. Stated most concisely, he
agrees with originalists that the semantic content of the Constitution’s
words (i.e., the linguistic meaning of those words in English) must be
respected. With that one limitation, virtually all provisions of the Constitution can shift and develop in response to policy considerations of
various kinds. In his view, this is permissible on originalist grounds
because the text does not expressly forbid it and because the Constitution is above all a plan of government meant to operate indefinitely.7
Thus, originalism is living constitutionalism.8
INTERPRETATION

AND

CONSTRUCTION

Consistent with a recently popular strain of constitutional theorizing, Balkin distinguishes between “interpretation” and “construction.”9 At first, this may seem quite odd. The verbs “interpret” and
“construe” are synonyms, and “construction” is the substantive form
of “construe.” In the law, interpreting or construing a provision is not
limited to identifying the bare semantic content of its words. It includes decisions about which one of multiple possible linguistic meanings most likely reflects what the lawgiver meant, especially when
applying a legal provision to a particular set of facts. That meaning is
what genuine originalism seeks, and it is also what courts almost always purport to find except when they regard themselves as confined
by precedent.
So what’s going on here? Happily for Balkin’s project, “construction” is also the substantive form of “construct,” and constructing a
provision suggests a great deal more latitude than construing it does.
Accordingly, Balkin defines interpretation very narrowly as the ascertainment of the semantic content of words.10 Constructing is the remainder of what used to be called interpreting or construing. And in
construction, almost anything goes. The only real constraint, in
Balkin’s view, is that a construction must be one that the words of the
text “can bear.”11 So if a provision is vague or ambiguous, the best
7. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 21–34 (2011).
8. Balkin rightly notes that living constitutionalism mostly takes place in the political branches. See, e.g., id. at 283. I focus in this essay on the normative principles of
judicial decision-making, without addressing questions raised by positive political science, such as why judges, legislators, and other officials behave as they in fact do
behave.
9. For somewhat different discussions of the distinction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT,
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013).
10. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 7, at 12–13.
11. Id. at 254, 267 (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents
(Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 392 (2007)).
Although Balkin counsels constructors to consult history, this is little more than a
search for rhetorical ways to connect “our present political aspirations and commit-
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construction will be what best fits the constructor’s vision of what will
give us the best Constitution, so long as it is within the realm of linguistic possibility.
The Constitution may contain a few provisions whose meaning can
be identified through what Balkin calls interpretation, such as the
minimum age of the President and the rules for representation in the
Congress.12 But Balkin himself subtly suggests that there may be no
provisions absolutely immune from being constructed into something
everyone today would regard as patently absurd. “Some kinds of
changes—like the abolition of the Electoral College or altering the
length of the president’s term of office—cannot easily be achieved
through construction; they require amendment.”13 Difficult it may be
without a formal amendment, but a sufficiently clever constructor is
likely to arise if urgent circumstances seem to demand the desired
result.14
ORIGINAL MEANING

AND

ORIGINAL EXPECTATIONS

In Balkin’s view, traditional originalism mistakenly conflates the
original meaning of a provision with the way its enactors expected it
to be applied.15 Originalists, of course, need not reject every unforeseen application of the Constitution. Nobody maintains that the Navy
must use only wooden sailing ships or that the Free Speech Clause
does not apply to writings posted on the Internet. And sometimes the
text of the Constitution may have implications that few of its enactors
foresaw.16 Genuine originalism, however, requires that the purpose of
ments with the aspirations and commitments of previous generations, including not
only the adopting generation but all that succeed it.” Id. at 268; see also id. at 229
(asserting that history provides a resource, not a command).
12. Id. at 14, 230. As we shall see later in this essay, however, a living originalist
could construct the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in a way that reduces the minimum age
of the President from thirty-five to eighteen.
13. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis added).
14. Perhaps Balkin only means to say that an amendment would be required because the easy path of construction is foreclosed by the semantic meaning of the Constitution’s words. If so, he underestimates the power of his own theory. The words of
the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, can easily be constructed so as to abolish
the Electoral College because of its unequal apportionment.
15. See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 7, at 6–12.
16. One possible example involves Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over cases
“between a State and Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793), held that this provision authorized a suit by a citizen
of South Carolina against the state of Georgia. That conclusion was consistent with
the text and with considerable extrinsic evidence, although there is also evidence
pointing in the other direction. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, 16–20 (1985). The
swift repudiation of Chisholm in the Eleventh Amendment does not by itself imply
that the Court was mistaken. Nor does that repudiation imply that later Courts correctly expanded sovereign immunity well beyond what the text of the Eleventh
Amendment requires. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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the provision as it was originally understood should constrain its application. If the enactors meant to leave specific laws or practices unaffected, a contradictory purpose may not be imputed to vague or
ambiguous texts. Whatever difficulties and uncertainties may attend
the originalist interpretive task—and there are many—newly attractive purposes may not be allowed to distort or displace those that the
enactors sought to effect. The original purposes, moreover, include
the limits on the extent to which the enactors meant to advance those
purposes.
When discussing specific constitutional provisions, Balkin often creates a simulacrum of originalism by appealing to evidence of what the
enactors’ purposes actually were. His theory, however, does not require any such evidence, let alone the best evidence. The distinction
he draws between interpretation and construction allows him to impute to the text any purpose he favors, so long as the words “can
bear” the meaning he chooses.17 One example is Balkin’s argument
that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a
right to abortion.18
Abortion restrictions were commonplace in 1868, and Balkin offers
no evidence that the words of the Fourteenth Amendment would have
been understood to make those restrictions unconstitutional. Instead,
he invokes selected passages from the legislative history to support his
contention that the Fourteenth Amendment stands for a general principle of “equal citizenship.”19 With this elastic principle in hand,
Balkin argues that a right to abortion is necessary to vindicate women’s right to equal citizenship.20 The scope of that right turns out to
be almost identical to the one generated through pure living constitutionalism in the Roe/Casey line of decisions.
Balkin’s method can even more easily be used to establish a constitutional right not to be aborted. Unborn children are a vulnerable and
politically powerless minority. Allowing them to be summarily killed
deprives them of the “equal protection of the laws” in a much more
obvious way than abortion restrictions deprive women (an electoral
majority) of equal citizenship. It may be true, as Balkin maintains,
that the words of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have been
thought applicable to the unborn in 1868. So what? It is no less true
that those words would not have been thought to create a right to
abortion.
Balkin openly acknowledges that the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment need not be those of its enactors: “[I]t follows from my
[i.e., Balkin’s] arguments that there could be other constitutional prin17. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 7, at 254, 267.
18. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007).
19. See id. at 313–15.
20. See id. at 322–25.
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ciples [i.e., other than “equal citizenship”] embodied by the Equal
Protection Clause that no particular person living in 1868 intended but
that we come to recognize through our country’s historical experience.”21 The importance of this statement should not be underestimated, for it rejects an indispensable element of originalism. Now, just
as the original expected applications of a constitutional provision do
not limit its meaning, neither do the purposes of its enactors. Nothing
limits the Constitution’s ongoing “construction” except the outer
bounds of all the possible linguistic meanings of its words. Any meaning those words “can bear” suffices.
All laws, moreover, are unequal in the sense that they treat different classes of people differently—if nothing else, they have different
effects on different people.22 Thus, one can attack any law on the
ground that it violates some imputed meaning that the words of the
Equal Protection Clause “can bear.” As the abortion example shows,
once one is free to impute to the Constitution purposes that conflict
with those of its enactors, what is left of originalism is only the grin of
the Cheshire Cat.
SEX DISCRIMINATION

AND

ORIGINALISM

As in his abortion argument, Balkin frequently finds legislative history that he can invoke in defense of whatever purpose he chooses to
impute to the Constitution. This is particularly easy to do when constructing the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as the words of Section
One “can bear” almost any meaning one wants to give them, its legislative history contains an extraordinary number of conflicting statements about its purpose, many of which are nearly as ambiguous or
vague as the constitutional text itself.
Not surprisingly, Balkin’s own constructions consistently—indeed
without exception so far as I have noticed—produce results agreeable
to the dominant political views of the legal academy.23 What is somewhat surprising is that Balkin’s theory has been widely accepted in the
academy as a form of originalism.24 More surprisingly, Balkin even
seems to be persuading originalists themselves to relinquish the key
principle that the original purposes of the Constitution constrain the
interpretation or construction of its language.
21. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 498 (2007).
22. Cf. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 7, at 233–34 (advocating the
construction of an equal protection disparate-impact doctrine).
23. Balkin does acknowledge that his theory permits the construction of some sort
of Second Amendment private right to keep and bear arms, but he shrewdly leaves
open the scope of any such right under what he would consider the “best construction.” Id. at 207, 271.
24. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 433 (2013).
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A striking example can be found in the writings of Professor Steven
G. Calabresi, who is one of Balkin’s converts.25 A founder of the Federalist Society, Calabresi clerked for Judge Robert H. Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia. He was a special assistant to Attorney General
Edwin Meese III and a speechwriter for Vice President Dan Quayle.26
He went on to become one of the most frequently cited academic
originalists of his generation.27 If Calabresi now adheres to Balkin’s
theory, wedding bells are ringing pretty loudly for the union of
originalism and living constitutionalism.
Consider Calabresi’s discovery that the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids discrimination based on sex.28 This
claim contradicted a near universal consensus among originalists and
non-originalists alike. Calabresi acknowledges that both the text and
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly indicate
that it was not meant to invalidate laws treating men and women differently. In his view, however, this is merely an example of what he
and Balkin call irrelevant “expected applications.” The purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to outlaw “caste systems,” and those
who enacted the Amendment did not realize that women were an oppressed caste. Their mistake arose because they thought that women
are not fitted by nature to be treated like men, but “[w]e now know
more about women’s capabilities than the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Framers knew.”29
25. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663 (2009).
26. For additional biographical information, see Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren
Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and Constitutional Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155, 159 (2013); Steven G. Calabresi & Justin
Braga, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Response to Professor Bruce
Allen Murphy and Professor Justin Driver 2, 23, 25 (Nw. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-05; Nw. Public Law Research Paper No. 15-10) (copy downloaded Feb. 28,
2015, on file with the Texas A&M Law Review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2569336 [http://perma.cc/9BP8-ZKES].
27. For examples of Calabresi’s pre-conversion views, see Steven G. Calabresi,
The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor
Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (2005) (“There is simply no way to
argue that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have understood sodomy
or abortion as a privilege or immunity.”); Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and
the Constitution: Some Originalist and Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 312–13
(2005) (presenting “an argument as to why the Supreme Court ought to follow the
text of the Constitution, as originally understood, rather than its own precedents,
where there is clear conflict between the two” (emphasis added)); Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on
Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2004)
(arguing that unenumerated rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are limited to those that are deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition, and concluding that there is no constitutional basis for a right to sodomy).
28. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011).
29. Id. at 9.
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To the extent that Calabresi is opining that the opinions of the framers about the appropriate role of women in a healthy social order
were misguided, this is typical noninterpretivism or living constitutionalism. To the extent that Calabresi thinks those framers were factually
mistaken about women’s capabilities, he is himself on very shaky factual grounds. The men who devised the old rules of coverture, for example, could not have thought that getting married somehow deprives
women of the physical or mental capacity to own property or form
contracts.
Nevertheless, Calabresi has a separate and seemingly more originalist argument. He begins by noting, quite correctly, that the Nineteenth
Amendment nullified the one form of sex discrimination approved by
the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.30 Next, he claims that conferring the political right to vote on any group was understood to confer
all the civil rights that are protected by Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment: “[P]olitical rights exist at the apex of a rights hierarchy,
and a guarantee that they will not be denied on a particular basis creates a presumption that denying civil rights on that basis violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.”31 This argument, like some of Balkin’s constructions, formally resembles originalism. Substantively, however, it
does not.
First, Calabresi provides no evidence of a consensus that conferring
the franchise on a group automatically carries with it all the civil rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The enactors of the Nineteenth Amendment had every reason to expect that women’s civil
rights would expand as a result of the voting power they were given by
its terms. This is quite different from constitutionalizing that
expansion.
Second, from early times many states granted the franchise to
aliens. This class is not protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, which Calabresi takes as the primary originalist source of protection for civil rights. He dismisses the relevance of this fact on the
ground that jurisdictions that gave aliens the franchise “generally”
also protected their civil rights.32 It is hardly surprising that they
would do so, but it does not follow that the one automatically implies
the other. Even today, felons may vote in many jurisdictions but they
do not enjoy the full range of civil rights.33
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (penalizing states that denied the franchise
in federal elections to male inhabitants twenty-one years of age or older).
31. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 28, at 76.
32. Id. at 83.
33. Felons, for example, are forbidden to possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2013). As it happens, the Supreme Court has held that the right to keep and bear
arms is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and has also referred approvingly to
firearms disabilities imposed on felons. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
786, 791 (2010).
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Third, Calabresi’s formally originalist argument about the Nineteenth Amendment implies that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment grants
the full range of political and civil rights to everyone who is at least
eighteen years old, which means that it altered the constitutional age
qualifications for various federal offices.34 He tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that “age is undeniably different from race and
sex.”35 Well, sex is also undeniably different from race. If the Nineteenth Amendment automatically declares the differences irrelevant
with respect to the civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, why does the Twenty-Sixth Amendment not do exactly the
same thing with respect to age? Calabresi’s answer is that age is different in ways that he considers significant, just as the enactors of the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments thought sex was different
from race in ways they thought significant. It is hard to tell whether
Calabresi has lapsed into pure living constitutionalism or into what he
regards as the mistake of confusing expected applications with original
meaning.36 But it is even harder to see a third alternative.
We are all guilty of lapses, and perhaps Calabresi inadvertently confused the appearance of originalism with its substance in making his
Nineteenth Amendment argument. It turns out, however, that he has
unmistakably abandoned originalism, perhaps unknowingly.
CONSTRUCTING NEW FORMS

OF

SEX DISCRIMINATION

Stated most concisely, Calabresi concludes that “[t]he Nineteenth
Amendment, read together with the Fourteenth Amendment, provides a legitimate basis for striking down almost all sex-discrimination
laws.”37 The use of the word “almost” here reminds us that he had
spoken earlier of a “presumption” that particular forms of discrimination violate the Fourteenth Amendment.38 What are the exceptions,
we wonder, and how can the presumption be overcome?
Calabresi identifies one exception, namely laws against abortion.39
Such laws obviously discriminate against women, the only class of
people who can become pregnant. One can easily show that the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, as their texts and purposes were
understood by the enactors, do not imply abortion rights. But that
would involve what Calabresi thinks is a mistaken reliance on “original expectations.”
34. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 28, at 76–77 (asserting that the right to
vote implies the right to hold political offices).
35. Id. at 98.
36. See id. The differences he identifies between age and race or sex may be relevant to Calabresi’s pure living constitutionalist argument about “castes,” but they are
not relevant to his formally originalist argument about the Nineteenth Amendment.
37. Id. at 99.
38. Id. at 76 (quoted supra at text accompanying note 31).
39. Id. at 99.

40

TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Accordingly, he vaguely suggests that it is unclear when human life
begins, with the apparent implication that the Constitution leaves
abortion regulations to the discretion of legislatures.40 But one could
say much the same about many other laws that discriminate on the
basis of sex. It is unclear whether there are good reasons for discriminating against men in child custody disputes, or in setting minimum
drinking ages. It is also unclear whether there are good reasons for
ignoring actuarial realities in setting social security benefits, or for ignoring physical differences between the sexes in setting rules for military service. The examples could be multiplied, and it is not an
originalist answer to say, as Calabresi says in general about the capabilities of women, that “we” know more than the enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment knew. Like the rest of us, Calabresi has opinions
that do not constitute knowledge. And once one assumes that the
original purpose of a constitutional provision can be set aside because
of what “we” merely believe, even the semblance of originalism will
fade away.41
Calabresi might respond that drawing lines between permissible
and impermissible forms of discrimination is unavoidable under any
anti-discrimination rule. Judges and academic originalists therefore
just have to do the best they can in applying such a rule to specific
factual situations. Because all laws discriminate, that is obviously a
valid point. But it cannot imply that the expectations of the enactors
about applications that they would have rejected are irrelevant. Once
one accepts that proposition, originalism is gone.
At first, Calabresi sought to keep himself within the confines of
originalism by declaring that a constitutional amendment is a necessary precondition for recognizing that a previously unrecognized
“caste” gets all the civil rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.42 That implies that those who desire to enter into same-sex marriages will not have a constitutional right to do so until the
Constitution is amended.
40. Id. at 99–100.
41. It is fading before our eyes in Calabresi’s scholarship. See Steven G. Calabresi
& Justin Braga, Judge Robert H. Bork and Professor Bruce Ackerman: An Essay on
the Tempting of America, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 55 (2015) (“Maybe a better case
[than the one in Justice Douglas’s Griswold opinion] can be made for the outcomes in
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
should be disinterred.”).
42. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 28, at 97 (“[A] definitive showing that a
law relegates a group to caste status—and is therefore a violation of Section One—is
not easy to make and . . . ought only to be made where there is an Article V consensus
of three-quarters of the states.” (emphasis added)). Elsewhere, Calabresi distinguishes between “a constitutional amendment” and “an Article V consensus of threefourths of the states that something that used to be allowed has now come to be seen
as a form of caste-based discrimination.” Calabresi & Fine, supra note 25, at 694. So
much for the text of Article V.
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Astoundingly, however, Calabresi now maintains that sexual orientation discrimination is a creature of caste and “that history and the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ineluctably lead” to
the conclusion that freedom to marry anyone without regard to their
sex is guaranteed by the Constitution.43 So much for his previous position on the need for a new constitutional amendment.44
In support of his supposedly ineluctable conclusion, Calabresi begins with a very long list of quotations demonstrating that “[t]he Ark
[sic] of American history has egalitarian roots that go back to Seventeenth Century England and New England.”45 No one could deny that
equality has been an important concept in American history and law.
But neither has any sane person ever maintained that every kind of
equality is either desirable or possible, let alone required by law. His
challenge is therefore to show that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the particular kind of equality achieved by legalizing same-sex
marriage.
Calabresi’s “ineluctable” logic goes like this: Laws discriminating on
the basis of sex are unconstitutional (as he argued in Originalism and
Sex Discrimination46) and anti-miscegenation laws are unconstitutional (as he argued in a subsequent article47); ergo, traditional marriage laws are unconstitutional: “Same sex marriage laws allow a man
to marry a woman but not another man. This is, again as a formal
matter [i.e., as in the interracial marriage context], sex discrimination
plain and simple.”48
This argument is a play on words, plain and simple. As a formal
matter, traditional marriage laws do not discriminate against either
men or women.49 And as a formal matter, Jim Crow anti-miscegenation laws were not racially discriminatory. That is why a unanimous
Supreme Court initially upheld those Jim Crow laws against an equal
protection challenge, saying that “the offense against which this [stat43. Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage
26–27 (Nw. Public Law Research Paper No. 14-51) (emphasis added) (copy
downloaded Feb. 24, 2015, on file with the Texas A&M Law Review), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509443 [http://perma.cc/4SNS-HZW5]. This
essay first appeared on SSRN in October 2014, with an indication that it would not be
published elsewhere. My citations refer to a revised version downloaded on February
24, 2015. Both versions are on file with the Texas A&M Law Review.
44. So much as well for Calabresi’s previous position on the constitutionality of
anti-sodomy laws. See sources cited supra note 27.
45. Calabresi & Begley, supra note 43, at 23.
46. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 28.
47. See Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1393.
48. Calabresi & Begley, supra note 43, at 24.
49. Nor do these laws discriminate against homosexuals as a formal matter. Like
heterosexuals, these individuals are free to marry a person of the opposite sex, and
many have done so.
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ute] is aimed cannot be committed without involving the persons of
both races in the same punishment.”50
There is a sound originalist argument that anti-miscegenation laws
are unconstitutional: substantively they were aimed at frustrating the
one unquestioned purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. That purpose was to help dismantle the system of racial oppression enforced
by the Black Codes and later by Jim Crow. It is because of their role
in maintaining this genuine caste system that these laws violated the
Constitution. The main elements of the argument can be found in Calabresi’s article on interracial marriage.51 But that brings us right back
to the irrefutable proposition that the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the dismantling of whatever metaphorical caste system people in the twenty-first century may believe
homosexuals—and perhaps other discrete classes—have been subjected to.52 If Calabresi no longer thinks that a constitutional amendment is required to advance such newly popular purposes, he can
construct the Fourteenth Amendment into whatever he wants it to be.
Could anything persuade Calabresi to recognize the constitutionality of traditional marriage laws? Apparently not: “[W]e have yet to
hear an exceedingly persuasive argument which will survive skeptical
scrutiny as to why gay marriage is more threatening to heterosexual
marriage than is the current legal regime which allows for gay and
heterosexual promiscuity, serial monogamy, polygamy, and easy, nofault divorce.”53 Calabresi elsewhere endorses laws against polygamy
and incest because he personally thinks they are “just” and for “the
general good of the whole,” though he now opposes criminal liability
for polygamy because he believes that enforcement would be “arbitrary and capricious.”54 These are declarations, not arguments. Using
his own method of constructing a right to same-sex marriage, it would
be child’s play to construct the Fourteenth Amendment into a shield
for polygamy, prostitution, incest (at least among adults), polyamorous marriages, and a variety of other unorthodox sexual relation50. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883).
51. Bizarrely, the article purports to reject “the use of any legislative history as a
tool in statutory or constitutional interpretation” because it is “the semantic original
public meaning of the enacted texts that should govern.” Calabresi & Matthews,
supra note 47, at 1395, 1398 (emphasis added). If you can’t imagine how the semantic
meaning of the Constitution’s words could possibly dictate the conclusion that antimiscegenation laws are unconstitutional, you’re right. In fact, Calabresi’s article relies
almost entirely on the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
52. Contrary to Calabresi’s fanciful suggestion, Calabresi & Begley, supra note 43,
at 25–26, traditional marriage laws do not create a hereditary and oppressive ruling
class like the examples mentioned in the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the Black Codes, European feudalism, and the Hindu castes.
53. Id. at 24–25. Until now, I had not heard that polygamy has already been
legalized.
54. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 47, at 1421; Calabresi & Begley, supra note
43, at 25.
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ships. Not to mention the thousands of other laws that many people
consider oppressively discriminatory and for which they have yet to
hear what they consider “an exceedingly persuasive argument.” Declaring oneself unpersuaded by other people’s views about justice and
the common good is a familiar form of political discourse, but it is not
originalism.
Steven Calabresi has been fully liberated from originalism, and this
new birth of freedom must be very enchanting. One might even celebrate Jack Balkin’s amazing success as a matchmaker by saying that
originalism wins when everyone wants to speak its language. As one
originalist puts it, “I would rather be co-opted than mocked.”55 Perhaps a living originalist should be contrasted with losers who have
been mocked and ostracized into social death. Whatever one’s reasons
for accepting Balkin’s proposal to marry originalism and living constitutionalism, doing so leaves originalism itself in a condition akin to the
legal death that married women experienced under the old rules of
coverture. Quite a victory.
55. Michael Ramsey, More from Ed Whelan on Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, THE ORGINALISM BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015, 10:18 PM), http://originalismblog.type
pad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/02/more-from-ed-whelan-on-originalism-and-same
-sex-marriagemichael-ramsey.html [http://perma.cc/EJT7-3JCM].

